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In July 2013 the British government unveiled its Future Reserves 2020: Valuable and 
Valued (FR20) policy, which aimed to significantly increase the capability and deployability 
of Britain’s reserve forces. Much of the policy’s focus was on the Territorial Army (renamed 
the Army Reserve [AR] in 2013 and referred to this throughout), which received £1.2 billion 
to expand, train and equip it to routinely deploy alongside the regular army (Ministry of 
Defence, 2013). A central organising principle of FR20 was the outsourcing of logistics 
functions to the AR in order to save costs (MoD 2013, p.22). The policy therefore significantly 
increased reliance on reserve logistics units to deliver military capability. More broadly, it 
represented the most profound organisational transformation of the AR since its inception in 
1908 and a central tenet of current British defence policy. As reserves expansion was portrayed 
as recompense for large reductions in regular manpower, the policy proved highly politically 
controversial (Author, forthcoming), and recent works have discussed FR20’s struggle to 
recruit to strength (Author, 2016; Edmunds et al., 2016). It is also not unique; FR20 was 
intentionally designed to reflect the US Army’s Total Force Policy’s successful reliance on 
National Guard and reserve forces during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Griffith 2009a). In 
its broader context, FR20 is therefore important in its own right. But its attempt to transform 
British reserve logistics units also raises highly interesting questions for cohesion scholars.  
This paper takes FR20’s attempt to transform the reserves as an opportunity to examine 
cohesion and professionalism in reserve logistics units and the impact of FR20 upon it. It has 
three central arguments. Firstly, contrasting the revisionist cohesion scholars, that social 
cohesion remains essential to explaining performance in reserve logistics units. Secondly, that 
FR20 is gradually changing the locus of cohesion logistics units through two interrelated 
developments; a decline in the emphasis on alcohol to generate social cohesion, and an increase 
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in professional values and status associated with the regulars. The paper then examines the 
unique nature of reserve logistics discipline to highlight the continued importance of social 
bonds in understanding their cohesion and professionalism. Drawing on this evidence, the 
conclusion contends that FR20 is slowly but profoundly changing the culture of, and social 
relations within, AR logistics units. In doing so, the paper argues that AR logistics cohesion is 
a blend of that identified by the classical and revisionist schools, and that reserve forces have 
rich potential for future cohesion scholars.  
The Cohesion Literature 
The ‘classical’ school of military cohesion holds that soldiers fight, and their groups stay 
together, due to the interpersonal bonds of the primary group (Shils and Janowitz, 1949). This 
social cohesion theory has proven highly influential in explaining military performance 
(Stouffer et al., 1949; Gal 1986; Wong, 2003; Siebold, 2007). However, ‘revisionist’ cohesion 
scholars have challenged the primary group theory from a military praxis perspective. For King 
(2006), Ben-Shalom et al. (2006) and Strachan (2006), effective performance is explained not 
by interpersonal social bonds between soldiers, but by the collective performance of the group. 
For these authors, the emphasis on effective collective training indicates that professionalism 
has superseded interpersonal bonds as the main source of cohesion in Western combat forces. 
The implications of this praxis-based theory of cohesion are far reaching. In The Combat 
Soldier (2013 p.339), King argued that the intensive collective training associated with Western 
military professionalisation has gone beyond the transformation of these forces’ effectiveness 
to fundamentally alter the nature of their social relations. He shows how the emphasis on 
professionalism has imbued current military practise with a moral force – a professional ethos 
– that unites military groups through their values and behaviours. Two are of particular interest 
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for this paper; the importance of individual and group status honour as a motivator for effective 
performance, and in place of the traditional punishment system for encouraging combat 
performance, an emerging paradigm of self-discipline (King 2013, 2015). Thus, 
professionalism is intricately linked with cohesion in western forces and has had a profound 
impact on the associative patterns between their combat soldiers.  
This praxis-based interpretation of cohesion sparked a healthy debate in the pages of 
this journal (Siebold, 2007; King, 2007; Siebold, Crabb, Woodward and King, 2016). 
Nevertheless, with some notable exceptions (Zurcher, 1965; Siebold, 1996), the vast majority 
of the cohesion literature has focused on regular infantry soldiers. This leaves open the 
interesting and important question of how do reserve logistics forces – with less time to train 
and therefore, theoretically at least, lower skill levels – generate and sustain their cohesion? 
Indeed, none of the sociological literature on reserve service (Ben-Ari and Lomksy-Feder, 
2011; Griffith, 2009a; Griffith, 2009b; Griffith, 2011; Lomsky-Feder et al., 2008; Sion and 
Ben-Ari, 2005; Vest, 2013; Weber, 2011), or the British reserves in particular (Beckett, 2008; 
Connelly, 2013; Dandeker et al., 2009; Edmunds et al., 2016; Kirke, 2008; Walker, 1990) has 
examined the nature of reserve logistics cohesion, nor the impact of professionalism upon it. 
Given FR20’s reliance on reserve logisticians to deliver capability, perhaps it is time to do so. 
Case Selection and Method 
A mixed-methods approach was used to best triangulate data and present the most 
comprehensive analysis of AR logistics cohesion possible. Between January 2014 and August 
2016, five field observations of reserve logistics units, and 14 group and 13 individual 
interviews, were conducted. In collaboration with the British Army, the field work and group 
interview units were selected by case – to ensure they had undergone organisational change as 
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a result of FR20 and represented a broad spectrum of unit geography, trade and experiences – 
and were also representative of the wider reserve logistics population. None of the units had 
deployed on operations in the past year. The field work was used gain contextual understanding 
of the ‘life world’ of reserve logisticians. Group interview data was analysed to identify 
common response themes using NVivo software. Quoted comments are therefore exemplary 
of themes commonly expressed in the data (n=300).  
Complementing this, a longitudinal survey of a wider random sample of reserve 
logistics units, including some of those units observed and interviewed, was used to generate 
data on reservists’ perceptions of FR20’s impact on unit cohesion. To strengthen the arguments 
concerning the rise of professionalism in reserve logistics forces, some data from regular 
infantry and logistics units were also included. The survey contained two questionnaires widely 
used in militaries: the modified Platoon Cohesion Index (PCI) and the Sub-Unit Readiness and 
Morale questionnaire (Griffith, 1988; Gal, 1988; Siebold, 2012). Between April and June 2015, 
and again during the same period in 2016, reserve logistics personnel were asked to participate 
through the chain of command. Approximately 1,500 personnel from a total 43 units were 
approached to participate in 2015, and the study sample (n=427) was confirmed as statistically 
representative of the wider reserve logistics population (n=4,617) by chi square goodness-of-
fit test (1, n = 427) = .39, p = .53. In 2016, however, the sample (n=258) was not statistically 
representative, and therefore three reserve sub-units with the highest response rates and internal 
validity over the 12 month period, and the regular infantry and regular logistics units, were 
used for the regular-reserve comparisons presented below. As a result, these comparisons, 
whilst internally highly statistically valid and accurate assessments of the differences between 
these groups, are not representative of the wider regular population and are thus indicative only.  
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Similarly, the limitations of this study must be recognised. Most notably, reserve 
logisticians’ functional variation could conceivably result in higher perceptions of social bonds 
vis a vis reserve infanteers or other arms. Nevertheless, all methods included representative 
samples of all ranks and were strengthened by the presence of senior reservists with many years 
of pre- and post-FR20 experience, and a small number of ex-regulars. Moreover, many of the 
respondents (approximately 30%) had prior combat arms experience increasing the strength of 
evidence. Regular and reserve infantry officers have also commented on earlier drafts of this 
manuscript and endorsed the arguments. Finally, the Ministry of Defence Research Ethics 
Committee approved the project.1 
The Persistence of Social Cohesion 
Before analysing reserve logistics cohesion, brief discussion of the differences between 
(groups) variables is needed. Unlike in the infantry – where different units share standardised 
skills and training techniques (King, 2006, 2013) – in logistics units the skills required of 
personnel are as varied as logistics functions themselves. In the British Army, these functions 
include transport and movement; port and maritime operations; explosive ordnance disposal; 
air dispatch; cleaning; and post duties, amongst others. There is therefore a vast difference in 
the skills required of logisticians compared to infanteers. Moreover, there is a difference 
between logistics trades requiring high levels of coordinated collective action and others reliant 
on individual skills. For example, one logistician may be individually responsible for operating 
an engine or driving heavy plant, whilst others could be part of air delivery teams that require 
coordinated collective action. The fact that some logistics trades are individual and others 
                                                 
1 For full details of methodology please see appendix. 
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require collective action has major implications for how reserve logistics soldiers generate and 
sustain their cohesion.  
For King, the cohesive bonds in the professional infantry are formed by intensive 
collective training and commitment to their profession. Following Festinger et al. (1950), he 
notes that the density of interactions amongst infantry soldiers is important; propinquity matters 
(King, 2013 p. 351). However, intensive training requires large amounts of time unavailable to 
part-time reservists. Although some reserve logisticians often have highly specialised skills 
from their civilian employment, with less time to train and shorter qualifying courses, there is 
usually a skills differential between them and the regulars. The part-time nature of reserve 
service also suggests that the density of interactions is lower than the regulars. Thus, 
theoretically, in reserve logistics units requiring collective action, social cohesion may still be 
very important. It would be expected to be even more so in individual trades. However, FR20 
is attempting to professionalise the reserves through increased training in order to better 
integrate them with the regulars and prepare them for routine deployment. This creates an 
interesting problem in terms of the extant cohesion literature. On the one hand, reserve logistics 
units may be more reliant on social bonds than the regulars. On the other, reserve 
professionalisation could be changing the nature of social relations in these units and hence 
their sources of cohesion.      
  While Bury and King (2015) have shown how interpersonal bonds still contribute to 
effective performance in the professional regular infantry, there has been no detailed analysis 
of reserve cohesion. Walker (1990) briefly discussed AR cohesion, highlighting the importance 
of ‘drill hall club’ social cohesion. This referred to the beers usually enjoyed in messes after 
weekday training, and he opined that the ‘activities at the drill hall club are perhaps as important 
as the evening training itself.’ Crucially, he noted that the social cohesion built ‘the regimental 
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esprit and unit identification critical for sustaining not only combat units, but also volunteer 
reserve units in which cohesion is a precursor for encouraging men to turn out for training.’ He 
also observed the importance of social events for generating cohesion and how reservists’ 
‘social life begins to revolve around the unit’ (Walker, 1990 p. 102, 105). For Walker, 
interpersonal bonds remained central to understanding AR cohesion in the late 1980s. Of 
course, when Walker was writing, only social cohesion had been identified. Thus, the question 
remains if, as AR logistics units professionalise, social cohesion remains as important as it did? 
In order to assess FR20’s impact on reserve logistics cohesion, first its nature was 
considered. To do this, interviewees were directly asked about the value they placed on the 
social element of service. The social element was left for respondents to define and describe as 
they wished; some referred to time spent socialising in the bar, others the bonds between 
colleagues. However, across ranks, the unanimity and strength of response was notable: 
‘The social element, I think, is important.’(Group interview 3, henceforth 3) 
 
‘It’s massive.’ (1) 
 
‘That’s a massive thing.’ (5) 
 
‘It's important. It's important for... a bit of an army lifestyle, isn't it? You've got to have 
that.’ (10) 
 
R1: ‘It’s key. It can’t be all work and no social element, because it is a lifestyle. 
The guys do deserve to get rewarded and there needs to be a balanced 
work/social environment. 
R2: ‘The guys are giving up their free time. They don't have to be here. So there’s 
a point where you need to sit down and give them something back.’(6)  
 
R1: ‘Hugely important. 
R2: Got to be. Yeah, massively.’ (11)  
 
Clearly, the social aspect of reserve service – that which generates and sustains interpersonal 
bonds – is deemed very important to reserve logisticians. It is viewed as an intrinsically vital 
part of their service, and as a reward for part-time volunteers’ commitment to training and duty. 
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This social element, with its organised events and socialising in the bar after duties, was stated 
to be reflective of regular practises:  
R1:  ‘I joined the reserve after leaving the regs because I was missing the craic [fun] 
with the boys, the laughs, the banter…’ 
R2:  One of the best things about the regs is the social life, you know, your summer 
balls and your Christmas balls. Again, regular social events… seem to have 
carried over to the reserves as well. (8)  
 
‘That's why I joined, really, [to] meet new people.’(10)  
Moreover, this social element provided a primary joining motivation for these soldiers. 
Previous surveys revealed that 86% of these reservists had joined to make new friends in the 
military, the second most cited reason for joining (Author, 2016 p. 31). Overall, this data 
indicates that socialising together is very important to reservists’ motivations for joining, and 
for generating and sustaining social solidarity once they have.  
However, the importance of social cohesion in these sub-units goes beyond a shared 
appreciation of the solidarity generated by simply socialising together. In fact, many units 
described the nature of their social relations in terms of being a ‘family’. Interestingly, some 
of the most cohesive and professional regular infantry units in the British Army also describe 
themselves as ‘family regiments’. This is usually interpreted as indicating dense associative 
patterns and strong interpersonal bonds across ranks, coupled with long histories of regimental 
service amongst certain families, and an often regional identity. Regular British family 
regiments are usually viewed as being highly socially cohesive. Decisively, this can be 
exclusive of, or complementary to, professional competence. A similar family motif was 
consistently repeated in interviews with reserve sub-units: 
R1: ‘We actually formed a very tight knit family. 
R2: A lot of infantry regiments work. They work because - 
R3: They are family. 
R2: - they are such a good family group… My old infantry [unit], it was like having 
500 brothers. 
9 
 
R1: But it is like being in an infantry regiment here, where you’ve got that family 
atmosphere. People looking out for one another...  
R4: I’ve been here a long time. I’ve seen a lot of change. But it is one big family. 
You can share your problems with people.’(2)  
The above quote is highly illustrative. Firstly, it displays an awareness of the influence dense, 
familial-like bonds can have in infantry regiments ‘that work’; that are effective. Indeed, this 
NCO is making an explicit association between strong interpersonal ties and effective unit 
performance. Secondly, these reservists’ perception of family appears to be slightly different 
from the regulars. Their unit’s ‘tight knit’ family is described as being based on ‘looking out 
for one another’ and ‘sharing problems.’ Reservists from other sub-units echoed these 
sentiments almost exactly: ‘It is a proper family job up here’ (1). Interpersonal relationships 
are therefore frequently described in profoundly social terms; they often surpass civilian 
friendship to become deeper, familial ties. Crucially, these attributes match those identified in 
the primary group by Shils and Janowitz. Indeed, that they were so readily repeated may 
indicate the prevalence of this conceptualisation of effective cohesion amongst the sample.  
Other reservists remarked on the importance of these relationships to their continued 
service: 
R1: ‘When I look back to mates who I’ve met through the AR, it is a big thing. I 
go out and socialise more with people from here than what I do with any of my 
work colleagues... I love being round the people here.  
R2: Aww!  
R3: It’s not mutual, though. [Laughter].’ (5)  
The first respondent’s assertion that his service comrades are his friends that he chooses to 
socialise with them outside of duties is interesting. Indeed, such is the depth of this 
social/emotional bond that he professes his love for them. This expression results first in 
tenderness from a female colleague, but is quickly followed with mock ridicule by a male, 
indicating both the uniqueness of the confession and the unease amongst other group members 
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at directly expressing the depth of their social bonds. This, of course, indicates their 
importance. Similar observations were made across other sub-units: 
R1:  ‘Most of my mates now are these guys here. Civvy lads who I went to school 
with, I say hello to them, but these are my mates.’(1)  
 
R1: ‘I quite enjoy coming down here for the friendship and that sort of stuff.  
R2:  They always have the bar open, even if there's only a few of us. We'll have a 
chat. 
R3: …You've got to get on with who you're working with, haven't you?’(10) 
While these quotes provide further evidence of the importance that socialising together has in 
the AR, it is important to note that collective training also plays a major part in generating 
social solidarity amongst reservists. Training often builds interpersonal bonds through shared 
hardship and reliance on others; professional training is conducive to social bonding in its own 
right. Thus, with FR20 pledging to increase training, the bonds generated by socialising within 
the reserves would expected to be strengthened further. However, the last quote above is 
particularly indicative about these reservists’ cohesion. King describes how some Royal 
Marines’ rescued a comrade that they did not like who was pinned down by enemy fire (2013, 
p.358). He argues that this represents the importance of professional comradeship over 
interpersonal ties; professional infanteers do not need to ‘like’ each other to perform 
effectively. Crucially, the reservist above seems to indicate that harmonious social relations are 
required in his sub-unit to encourage effective performance. Thus, it could be argued that 
interpersonal bonds are more essential in explaining cohesion amongst reserve logisticians than 
regular infanteers. This, of course, is important for understanding the locus of reserve logistics 
cohesion and effectiveness. However, there was no evidence to suggest this reliance on social 
cohesion was correlated with undisciplined or unprofessional behaviour per se. 
 One simple definition of cohesion is the ability of the group to stay together under stress 
(Siebold, 2012 p.44), and there is ample evidence to suggest that social bonds remain a key 
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motivating factor for these reservists remaining in service. The centrality of social cohesion 
was highlighted by one NCO, who stated: ‘I think if there hadn’t been a bit of social [life], I 
would have handed my kit in two years ago’(2). Thus, the social element of service is often a 
critically important retention factor. Indeed, it was responsible for this soldier remaining in 
service despite the organisational frictions he experienced as a result of FR20. Another reservist 
went further:  
‘It’s the thought that if I do leave, I’m going to be jacking on [letting down] my mates. 
And you’d miss it because you would want to know what they’re doing. And I think 
that’s what keeps you coming back even though it’s been really bad.’(2)  
For this NCO, social bonds are the central reason for his attendance at training, but also for his 
continued service in the wake of poor experiences of FR20. Crucially, he describes his 
motivation for remaining in service in terms of a strong sense of social obligation, to avoid 
‘jacking on my mates’. Moreover, this is explained in emotional rather than professional terms; 
that he would miss his colleagues. An officer in a different unit elucidated on why logistics 
reservists under his command frequently attended training: ‘They’re mates… so if they don’t 
turn up its: “Where were you?”’(8) Complementing the importance of the social aspect of 
reserve service for reasons for joining, it appears that interpersonal bonds provide a central 
explanation for these reservists’ attendance at training and their longer-term retention. 
Moreover, the nature of social relations between these reservists has consistently been 
described as those of friendship, or more profoundly as family. This locus differs to the 
cohesion King, Ben Shalom et al. and Strachan describe in the regular infantry. It is perhaps 
not too far to suggest that in these reserve logistics units social bonds remain central to 
cohesion. Indeed, social cohesion appears to be more essential in these units than in the regular 
infantry.  
The Decline of the ‘Drinking Club’ 
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Referring to civilian groups, John Bancroft has outlined how alcohol can be used to heighten 
‘group cohesion and solidarity’ (Bancroft, 2009 p.62), and in a later work on the British officer 
corps, I outlined the importance of the consumption of alcohol in generating their social 
solidarity (Author, 2016b). Walker also noted this amongst AR officers (Walker, 1990 p.105-
6). In fact, the social cohesion-generating function of collective alcohol intake has long been 
recognised by the British Army, and is reflected in the very cheap alcohol available in messes 
in most barracks. Given the greater emphasis on social cohesion in the reserves, it is therefore 
perhaps not surprising that in the past the AR was often perceived as a ‘drinking club’. This 
term was ubiquitous and often used derogatively, but it indicated a view held across the regulars 
and in some reserve units that socialising in the AR was emphasised over training.  
While the ‘drinking club’ theme has long been a useful social psychological tool for 
reservists to distance themselves from the perhaps less professional practises of their past 
colleagues,2 it did emerge as a major descriptor amongst AR logisticians for differentiating 
between pre- and post-FR20 service. The following senior NCO’s quote not only highlights 
the centrality of alcohol to the AR experience in the past, but also supports the arguments made 
about the importance of individual skill in effective collective performance in logistics units: 
‘In the days of the National AR, the [reservist] dockers used to come down and unload 
the ships to give 17 [Port and Maritime regiment - the regulars] some time off. They’d 
come down for two weeks [their annual training camp], but because they were 
professional dockers they could unload in half the time 17 could. So each ship would 
be done by lunchtime and they’d spend the rest of the time in the Corporal’s Mess 
getting hammered. The Mess used to take more in those two weeks than in the other 
50.’(26) 
However, this drinking club ethos was not only confined to logistics units. Other former 
infantry SNCOs reported similar experiences: 
                                                 
2 I am indebted to [] for this observation. See House of Commons Hansard Debates, 23 Mar 2005 : Column 
285WH 
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‘When I first joined in ‘97, my God, we used to jump on a 4-tonner [truck], go to 
Thetford and knock back three or four crates of lager, jump off, rock up, harbour, and 
you’re out on exercise all weekend. It was a drinking club.’(1)  
 
‘Back in the ‘80s… it was a drinking club…. When I was with the regulars, the AR 
was scum.’(2) 
Clearly, a widespread perception exists that AR activity was often centred on alcohol to the 
detriment of training. Socialising with alcohol is perceived as being more of a priority in the 
past. This, of course, provided easy means by which the professional regulars – themselves no 
strangers to drinking – could denigrate their AR rivals. Indeed, the prevalence of this motif for 
the pre-FR20 reserves indicates how the ‘drinking club’ became a label for describing the 
organisation’s perceived unprofessionalism. Crucially, however, its widespread use today 
allows current reservists to distance themselves from this perceived unprofessionalism, whilst 
also highlighting how reservists are internalising regular values. This indicates their importance 
in setting norms in today’s AR.  
Despite the continued existence of the drinking club metaphor, there is much evidence 
that its validity is waning. There are many contributing factors to this, including the closure of 
AR barracks and the enforcement of drink driving legislation, but amongst the sample, the 
primary reason was perceived to be a result of gradual AR professionalisation since 2003 which 
has been intensified by FR20: 
Mod:  ‘Do you think it’s [the drinking club ethos] changing in the reserves? 
All: Yes. 
R1: Big style. 
R2:  It was a drinking club. Now it’s not.’(8)  
For these respondents, FR20 has been critical to the decline of the drinking club ethos. Other 
experienced SNCOs directly made the link between it and increasing professionalism:  
‘The level that you have got to be at, the [professional] standard, it’s not a drinking 
club now, which it used to be.’(7)  
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Despite the prevalence of the drinking club motif, numerous interviews indicated that while 
this was seen as a valid label to describe the AR’s lack of professionalism in general, it was 
not applicable to their sub-units in particular (5, 7, 24), thus confirming its utility as a 
distancing mechanism. This not only highlights the sensitivity to being tarnished; it also 
indicates their desire to be viewed as professionals.  
While FR20’s increased training standards and the wider policy drive to reduce 
drinking have contributed to the decline of the drinking club (Soldier, 2016 p.12), there was a 
recognition that this culture needed to be explicitly addressed for this to happen. As a result of 
FR20, some unit Commanding Officers have issued new rules designated certain training 
weekends completely ‘dry’ (26). As one officer commented: ‘We have definitely 
professionalised as a unit. With the drinking club, there was a culture to break, and we have… 
The message went down that you’d better be ready for duty in the morning or standby.’(23) 
Another officer commented on the effect of this: ‘It is changing. And if that means some of 
the old and bold turn to the right and march off, then so be it… maybe that’s not such a bad 
thing’ (27). Other sub-units reported a decline in social events since FR20. Whether this was 
intentional or not was not revealed, but most reservists accepted it as the price of 
professionalisation; there is now less time for social events as the focus is on training.  
Although they are widely viewed as complementary and – in the AR’s case – 
intertwined, there is obviously a distinction between social cohesion and alcohol consumption. 
This was made by a number of reservists. One NCO stated that the AR today ‘is a social club 
mainly, not a drinking club’ (24). Another officer elucidated:  
‘I haven’t noticed a decrease per se, there’s still the social side to army drinking, but a 
lot of time after training we’d go to the bar and everyone has a Coke…the bar’s 
ambience and the extra time we have there on top of training is good for getting J1 
[personnel issues] done. So in terms of social cohesion, it’s important, even if people 
aren’t drinking.’(24)  
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The Mess therefore remains an important site for generating and sustaining social solidarity, 
even though the consumption of alcohol is less frequently the focus. Indeed, without alcohol, 
the distinction between Mess activity and professional duty appears to be increasingly blurred, 
allowing as it does administrative issues to be addressed to enhance sub-unit effectiveness. 
Supporting this, another officer spoke of how ‘a lot of networking is done up in the messes’ 
(11). As such, the ‘drinking club’ may be in decline, but the club itself remains profoundly 
social, and indeed, professionally useful, as – it must be noted – does the motif. 
The Rise of Professionalism 
While it is noteworthy that US reserve forces have been forced to professionalise due to their 
large-scale deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, and that British deployments to these 
conflicts did result in some reserve professionalisation in the 2000s (Author, forthcoming), it 
was clear from respondents that FR20 has provided extra impetus for professionalisation. 
Asked whether social cohesion had previously been based around the consumption of alcohol 
pre-FR20, one NCO stated: ‘I think it was… the new way – the [regular] army way – is about 
courses’ (11). While this quote underscores recent research on the increased availability of 
courses as a result of FR20, it also points to something more profound. FR20’s drive for 
professionalisation has resulted in a concerted move away from alcohol-aided social cohesion. 
As the NCO above suggests, these reservists’ new professionalism is increasingly based on that 
of the regulars; on training and competency. The processes by which reserve logistics sub-units 
are professionalising, and their implications, are closely related to understanding cohesion in 
these sub-units, and the overall impact of FR20. They are therefore worthy of further 
examination here.  
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In these reserve units, qualifications gained through attending courses, and importantly, 
operational experience, are increasingly viewed as the standard by which individual reservists 
judge themselves vis a vis the regulars. This new, more professional attitude appears to have 
gradually percolated into the AR during the increased deployment of reservists on operations 
in the 2000s. It has also been boosted by a marked increase in opportunities for all reservists to 
train and deploy with regulars as a result of FR20. This was confirmed by numerous interviews 
(1, 5, 6, 14), and complemented by a reported dramatic increase in trade course availability for 
reservists (1, 5, 6, 12, 14). While the ability of reserve units to meet the capabilities required 
by FR20 are discussed elsewhere (Author, forthcoming) the resulting exposure to the regulars 
has imbued a growing perception amongst these logistics reservists of their service being a job. 
The government’s 1978 Shapland Report stated that although AR service in the organisation 
was a ‘demanding hobby’, it was a hobby nonetheless. In the late 1980s senior officers also 
admitted to Walker that reserve service was a distant third priority after family and work 
(Walker 1990: 6, 44). While that order of priority may remain, Connelly (2013) also outlined 
numerous professional and cultural barriers to integration between the regulars and the 
reserves, including reservists’ perceived lack of professionalism. However, based on the 
sample, I contend that the conception of AR service is gradually changing. This is occurring in 
two distinct ways. Firstly, with the increased training burden, reserve service is now viewed as 
a job, albeit usually a part-time one, with the accompanying level of commitment and attention 
to detail required: 
R1:  ‘Even in the six years that I’ve been in, it’s gone from being a hobby to 
being a part-time job. You wouldn't miss your full time job so you can’t miss 
your part time job either. 
R2:  … [It’s part-time but] It’s still a job.’(5)  
In tandem with the decline of the drinking club, reserve logistics service – despite being part-
time and more reliant on social cohesion than the regulars – is not viewed as a hobby anymore. 
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The second distinct way the reserve logisticians are drawing closer to the regulars concerns 
individual reservists’ performance. Increasingly, these reservists must be individually 
competent enough to ‘do their job’. The importance of individual competency in order to work 
alongside the regulars safely and effectively was repeatedly emphasised:  
‘You have to be at that standard. You cannot think that you can rock up to a [regular] 
unit [not at their standard], because you’ve got to remember who you are representing 
as well.’ (7) 
 
‘You need to prove yourself you can do the job.’(6)  
The ability to fulfil their role competently on operations alongside the regulars is the ultimate 
standard by which these reservists judged their own professionalism. Another reservist 
explicitly commented on how the regulars’ performance acted as the yardstick by which 
professional competency is measured: ‘You test yourself a bit… in your mind they [reservists] 
benchmark against someone of the regular rank equivalent.’(1)  While the fact that reservists 
could never meet regular capacity due to their part-time nature was recognised (2), doing your 
individual job to the standard of the regulars is now seen as the benchmark for competency in 
training and on operations. For most respondents, the AR is now a part-time job. For others 
who have more time to take advantage of the increased opportunities to train and deploy – 
especially those without civilian employment – it is their full-time job, raising interesting 
questions about a growing core-periphery divide in the AR (Author, forthcoming).  
In doing your job, personal and collective status is at stake. Supporting King’s 
observations on status honour in the infantry, there are signs that these reservists are becoming 
increasingly aware of the need to earn and maintain their professional status by the measures 
defined by the regulars. While sensitivity about the regulars’ perception of reserve 
professionalism existed before the 2003 deployments, it appears that greater exposure to the 
regulars on operations and as a result of FR20 has increased this sensitivity. Across the sample 
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there was a desire to be viewed as being as capable as the regulars. This desire to match the 
regulars’ professionalism to maintain their own status and that of their sub-unit, and the AR’s 
reputation, was clearly put by an ex-regular: ‘We have to be at that standard because otherwise 
we are letting ourselves down.’(7) Indeed, professional reputation appears to be very important:     
R1 ‘They [the regulars] hate us. We’ve got such a bad name because of these guys. 
R2: Because of the old [sub-unit] was so dodgy and cut corners... they made so 
many mistakes. 
R3: They coated [Camp] Bastion in fuel.  
R1: Now we’re [new sub-unit], people are like, ‘Oh, who are you with?’ ‘We’re 
with [new sub-unit],’ all excited and happy [but] they’re like: ‘Err… fuck off,’ 
because of stuff that happened. We’ve inherited their bad reputation.’(1)  
This quote not only highlights a perceived lack of professionalism before FR20, but also an 
increasing sensitivity to the enduring impact of bad reputation as closer integration occurs. As 
these experiences show, reputation matters deeply to reservists.  
The surveys also provided complementary data in terms of professionalisation. 44% of 
respondents agreed that they ‘worried a lot about meeting the expected professional standard 
in their sub-units’, with 33% disagreeing. By comparison, a regular infantry sub-unit recorded 
50%, and 22% respectively. Previous research has identified that internalised, highly 
professional values are often a major source of personal anxiety in elite regular units 
(Thornborrow and Brown, 2009 p.365). This finding is interesting as an expected – albeit minor 
– difference between reserves and regulars is observable. Meanwhile, 52% of reservists agreed 
that ‘it was more important to be a good soldier than to be liked’, with only 15% in the disagree 
category, indicating the importance of professional values. This figure almost matched that of 
a regular infantry sub-unit (54% agreement, 10% disagreement). It was supported by another 
question concerning the risk of ‘deviant cohesion’ that Winslow (1999) identified can be a 
problem in units with high levels of social cohesion. Asked whether it was more important ‘to 
be “one of the lads” than a good soldier’ in their sub-unit, 68% disagreed, and only 12% agreed. 
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There therefore appears to be a strong awareness that social cohesion must be balanced by 
professional values. Thus, it appears that these reservists are experiencing the gradual 
permeation of the regulars’ ethos and norms into their domain. The reforms are gradually 
changing these reservists’ attitudes, bringing them in line with those of the full-time 
professionals. Nevertheless, for the majority of these reservists, the regulars are the final 
arbiters of their professionalism. 
By better integrating the reserves with the regulars, FR20 is slowly instilling a 
professional culture. This is evidenced by these logistics reservists’ desire to distance 
themselves from the drinking club motif; an increasing awareness of the standards expected on 
operations; the view that reserve service is no longer a hobby; and greater sensitivity about 
their performance-based personal and collective professional reputation. In short, these 
reservists increasingly see the regulars as the benchmark for performance and seek their 
approval to confirm their status. Nevertheless, despite gradual professionalisation, the 
importance of social cohesion still persists. In order to examine the extent to which sub-units 
had professionalised, respondents were asked the blunt but pertinent question if ‘unit members 
viewed each other as professionals or mates first?’ The responses below are indicative: 
All: ‘Mates. 
R1: I think that’s one of the biggest differences between the [reserves and 
regulars].’(8) 
 
R1: ‘Mates. 
R2: Family. 
R3: Family, yes. 
R4: Family, definitely. 
R5: Yes, definitely.’(7) 
 
Mod:  ‘Would you be mates with someone who is below the expected standard of 
their rank and experience? 
R1: No. 
R2: Yeah, we are. The thing is, we all have to help each other out.  
R3: It's still a family. 
R4: … You work as a family. I think. Once you're in here, you're family.’(10) 
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R1: ‘No. We’d be friends. 
R2: But not in the same way.’(1)  
Other reservists were asked whether they would be friends with a colleague who was ‘not up 
to the required professional standard’. 70% agreed that they would, highlighting the social 
locus of cohesion in these units. While the same percentage was recorded in a regular logistics 
sub-unit, in a regular infantry sub-unit this was only 50%. This is important as it provides strong 
evidence that the overwhelming majority of reserve logisticians, and an indicative sample of 
regular logisticians, continue to describe the nature of the relationships with their comrades in 
profoundly more social terms than the infantry. This suggests that despite ongoing 
professionalisation, social cohesion remains central to understanding the associative patterns 
between most reserve logisticians. But as the quote above indicates, there were some who did 
not view their relations in this manner, but in the more professional terms that have been 
identified in the infantry, where failure can result in immediate ostracism (King, 2013). Indeed, 
amongst higher ranks with more responsibility there were more qualified, if broadly similar, 
responses: 
R1:  ‘That’s a fine line because some of us have worked together 20 years.  
R2:  In this room, mates.  
R3: Can you not switch off from being a mate to a professional soldier when you 
need to?   
R3: I can be friends with so-and-so, and when it comes to Friday night we turn into 
a professional soldier.’(6) 
 
 ‘It depends what the situation is. If we're together in bar, it's mates. But when we're 
here on a Wednesday night, and we're doing stuff, it is professionals. It's got to be 
professionals. Ex-regular and all that, you've got to be professional.’(11) 
This understanding of professionalism as situationally-dependent is not unexpected given the 
literature on how reservists negotiate their identity. But it does indicate that notions of 
professionalism amongst these soldiers, and hence the sources of cohesion, are perhaps more 
fluid than in regular forces. It appears that even amongst these senior reservists and ex-regulars, 
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interpersonal bonds still remain important, and that professionalism can be switched on and off 
depending on context.   
Discipline 
In The Combat Soldier, King explicitly links the rise of professionalism in regular armies with 
a change in the source of their discipline. King argues that Western conscript armies of the 
early-mid twentieth century relied heavily on the threat of punishment to maintain battlefield 
discipline and encourage combat performance (King, 2013 p.362-75). In modern professional 
armies, however, he argues that discipline is much more reliant on soldiers’ self-discipline. 
This is due to the increasing importance of status honour, and the threat of professional shame 
amongst volunteer soldiers who do not perform to the expected standard. In contrast to a lack 
of official punishment, King details the often serious sanctions applied to group members who 
fail to perform effectively, like a Parachute Regiment soldier ostracised for poor performance 
in training and a Royal Marine publicly ridiculed for similar conduct in combat (King, 2015). 
For King, the intensive collective training conducive to heightened professional obligations 
between soldiers has changed the nature of military discipline in some Western armies. Indeed, 
he later contended that ‘A new paradigm of military discipline seems to have emerged’ (King, 
2015 p.112). This new paradigm is reliant on core groups of comrades united by 
professionalism and enduring social relations to motivate correct performance (King, 2016, 
p.720). According to King, the primary power of professional self-discipline amongst combat 
soldiers is strengthened by dense social bonds in these core groups. It is important to stress 
here that in these combat core groups, friendship is subordinated to professionalism (King, 
2016, p.722). 
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Another important work here is Thornborrow and Brown’s fascinating case study of 
identity and discipline in the British Parachute Regiment. Like King, for these authors the 
aspiration to be an elite ‘Para’, and the threat of professional and social ostracism for failing to 
meet the expected standards, are central to explaining the high levels of self-discipline and 
individual performance in the unit. Crucially, they show how the desire to conform to the 
heightened professional behaviour expected in elite regular units functions like a Foucauldian 
pan-opticon to monitor interactions and encourage performance (Thornborrow and Brown, 
2009 p.364-8). Echoing King’s observations about the threat of group ostracism for 
performance failures, this occurs to such an extent amongst the Paras that even experienced 
senior ranks reported status anxieties during routine duties (Thornborrow and Brown, 2009 
p.365). Thus, for these authors, self-discipline and surveillance – both based on professional 
competence – are crucial to understanding performance in infantry units.   
However, neither of these important works addresses the nature of discipline in non-
infantry forces, nor in a reserve force that is gradually professionalising. In 1990, Walker noted 
that, due its volunteer ethos, AR discipline was ‘lax’ and ‘ad hoc’ compared to the regulars. 
One AR officer’s comment at this time is illustrative: ‘there was a dull indifference to 
discipline, but a wonderful loyalty to duty’ (Walker, 1990 p.71). This quote indicates that at 
this time formal punishments were rarely resorted to and instead there was a high degree of 
self-discipline. However, the decisive fact that – despite ongoing integration with the regulars, 
and in contrast to them – every AR parade is still voluntary suggests that the nature of discipline 
may still be somewhat different from the regulars. The lower enforcement of military discipline 
in the reserves was frequently commented upon in the sample, and nearly always in reference 
to the application of Army General Administrative Instruction (AGAI) 67 system which 
governs both regular and reserve forces. For example: 
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‘The AGAI system is there, but we don’t need to use it.’ (2) 
 
R1: ‘I think that’s [discipline] one of the biggest differences between the two.  
R2 It’s much more relaxed, yes.  
R3: More relaxed but the job still does get done.’ (8) 
 
‘If you try and do discipline like you would in the [regular] battalion, you would not 
have people turn up.’ (10) 
 
These groups consisted of some ex-regulars, adding credibility to their claims that reserve 
discipline is different. Moreover, AGAI 67 action was widely perceived by these reservists to 
be resorted to much more frequently in the regulars as their contractual and legal obligations 
compelled them to duty and discipline in a way that, whilst also applicable to reservists, is 
unenforceable in reality. A reserve unit’s regular adjutant (the officer responsible for discipline) 
supported these claims:  
‘Discipline is different… the AGAI system is a blunt sword to be honest. The thing is, 
every parade is a voluntary one, and using the discipline system is contrary to what 
you are trying to achieve. But it is used and we do use it. You don’t get it for in-
subordination or [bad] turnout; those incidents occur less than in the regs. To be honest, 
most of the discipline issues are alcohol-related, like the regulars.’(23) 
Other reservists noted the difference between reserve infantry and logistics units. 
R1: ‘Discipline’s slightly different. The infantry was more disciplined. Here it’s...  
R2:  A bit more laid-back. 
R3: Relaxed.  
R1: To be honest with you, sometimes you’d rather have the infantry here… you 
knew where you stood.’(5) 
Contrasting King and Thornborrow and Brown, these views indicate that logistics reservists 
still perceive discipline in the regulars, and in the infantry, in the traditional terms of 
punishment, rather than the emergent paradigm of professional self-discipline.  
 If the punishment system is not as frequently resorted amongst these reservists, then 
how is discipline maintained? Unsurprisingly, the lack of use of the official discipline system 
compared to the regulars was consistently normalised by reference to the reserves’ own 
distinctive discipline. For instance:   
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‘It's a different mentality. I've got recruits, I can't drag them around the floor because 
they won't come in. I mean, they do things wrong. I'm not one for shouting and bawling 
at people. I don't like being shouted and bawled at at work.’(10)  
 
R1: ‘That’s always been the best thing about the AR, isn’t it? 
R2: …That’s the difference in mentality in the AR and the regs. A regs bloke would 
be like: “Get a fucking grip, sort your life out,” and beast them until they get 
it right. 
R3: ….There’s much more competition for promotion in the regs. Guys want to 
look better than somebody else.’ (8) 
For these reserve logisticians, discipline is perceived as reflecting a different mentality based 
on their volunteer identity. It is also enshrined in the different regular/reserve terms of service, 
whereby reservists are not punished for missing parades. Both are conducive to a reluctance, 
perhaps more prevalent in logistics units, to robustly enforce standards through verbal and 
physical punishments traditionally associated with regular discipline. As the last quote 
suggests, the lack of professional competition in the reserves is one reason for this. Another is 
that, without fully enforceable punishment, the social bonds of friendship are much more 
important in encouraging correct behaviour and, ultimately, turnout in the reserves. This 
highlights the recognition that resorting to the discipline system indicates the breakdown of 
social harmony which is crucial for working relationships. The quote below is instructive: 
R1:  ‘If one of your brothers makes a FUBAR [Fuck Up Beyond All Recognition], 
how do you deal with it? 
Mod: You’re going to tell him. 
R1: And that’s what it’s like here. Sort of: “Come on. Don’t let the rest of the 
family down,” sort of thing... You don’t want the rest of the family to suffer 
for a simple mistake…’ (2) 
Maintaining the reputation of the unit is notable here, as are the deeply social terms in which 
this reputation is conceived. But related to this, the respondent is also suggesting that the 
informal enactment of social bonds – of social obligation – is used to encourage performance, 
The core reservist group, based on the social bonds between ‘brothers’ or ‘family’,  appears 
very important in doing so. Indeed, another NCO stated: ‘We tend to try and sort things out at 
a low enough level’ (2); colleagues discipline each other informally for bad behaviour. These 
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points are informative as they suggest that discipline in reserve logistics units may in fact be 
closer to that of the professional regulars than the reservists above initially acknowledged. In a 
slightly different way to that observed by King and Thornborrow in elite infantry, it appears 
that the power of interpersonal – rather than professional – bonds primarily encourages 
performance in these units. The vector of self-discipline is different.  
However, reservists were cognisant of the fact that the need for social solidarity has its 
dangers. ‘I think we should AGAI more people because the discipline sometimes is a bit 
close… Because we are volunteers and we all know each other, sometimes we do get a bit 
wishy-washy.’ Similarly, they noted how, like the regulars, informal punishments were much 
less robust, or ‘colourful’, than in the Cold War-era AR (2). Nevertheless, there was a general 
sense that, despite the reluctance to use the discipline system, the reserves are still relatively 
disciplined. According to one commander: ‘There are far less discipline problems… [but 
conversely] there's less discipline in the reserves, and that's not because we're shying away 
from it, it's generally because the guys want to be here, they volunteer to come here, and they 
don't want to burn their bridges.’(3) This quote again highlights the perception that reservists 
who volunteer for each parade generally have better self-discipline compared to some regulars. 
While this is in fact questionable as more lax conditions of service could be perceived as 
conducive to lax discipline,3 given the importance of social cohesion in these units, it was 
interesting to note how ex-regulars related this trust-based discipline to social events involving 
alcohol: 
‘I think there’s a little bit of a trust element as well. Generally the age of the reservist 
is slightly older than a regular soldier. They know their boundaries, particularly with 
drink...’(6) 
                                                 
3 I am indebted to [] for this insight. 
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As another regular officer commented:  ‘Yes, we can trust them… they don’t take the piss as 
much.’(3) Trust, therefore, seems to play an important part in explaining discipline in the 
reserves. While this trust may rest more on social rather than professional obligations, it 
nonetheless exists. Indeed, reservists’ recognised maturity also indicates the central importance 
of self-discipline in building this trust.  
The importance of this maturity in explaining reserve discipline was also evident in 
how these reservists dealt with unit members who performed badly. As detailed by 
Thornborrow and Brown, and King, in the regulars the punishment for poor performance is 
frequently social and professional ostracism from the core group. Professional status brings 
with it the threat of professional shame. In the less professionalised reserves, the opposite 
appears to be the case. Faced with less time to train and therefore varying degrees of skill, 
instead of excluding failing members, most of these reserve logisticians viewed such 
individuals as the target for development and encouragement rather than ire and exclusion: 
R1: ‘We always help each other out. If someone’s struggling with something... 
R2:  Find out why.  
R3: Help them.’(8) 
 
‘You help them out, don’t you?’(7) 
Clearly then, unlike their regular colleagues, there is an innate awareness amongst reserve 
logisticians of their professional limitations. As the costs of professional failure are not as high 
as in the regulars, a more conciliatory approach focused on rehabilitation and mentoring is 
usually followed. This is in stark contrast to some regular units.  
Taken together, the lack of use of the AGAI system, the different mentality of self-
discipline and trust, and the more conciliatory approach to poor performance suggests that 
discipline in these units is different to that identified in the regular infantry. This is perhaps 
unsurprising given the former’s reliance on social cohesion; as a result interpersonal bonds 
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likely have greater regulatory power than in the regulars. But this situation also stands in 
contrast to discipline in conscript armies, which although they relied heavily on social 
cohesion, used the punishment system frequently (King, 2015). Drawing on the evidence 
presented above, perhaps it is not too much to theorise that the discipline above appears to be 
a hybrid of that discussed in the cohesion literature, blending the new professional paradigm 
of self-discipline with a reliance on social cohesion’s interpersonal relationships for 
enforcement. Hence the paradox in reserve logistics discipline: on the one hand, the AGAI 
system is not used as it destroys the social cohesion upon which discipline relies. On the other, 
it is not needed precisely because social bonds act as a disciplining mechanism when self-
discipline has failed. While FR20 is likely to gradually increase the strength of professional 
shame through better integration with the regulars, given this distinct nature of reserve 
discipline, it is unlikely to fully solve this paradox in the short term.  
Conclusion 
This article examined the nature of reserve cohesion, professionalism, and discipline in a 
sample of reserve logisticians to determine the impact of FR20 on units that are critical to its 
success. Despite the distinction with the infantry between collective and individual logistics 
trades, overall it is clear that social cohesion remains central to explanations of why reserve 
logisticians join, attend training, and remain in the AR. It is also clear that social cohesion also 
encourages their performance. As these reservists spend less time united as a group, it is 
possible to submit that social cohesion appears to be more important in the British reserves 
more broadly than in the regulars, and it is likely – and indeed wise – for it to remain so. 
Nevertheless, supporting the revisionists, FR20’s drive for professionalism has led to a decline 
in the drinking club ethos in these units. Simultaneously, professional-based cohesion is 
growing. Due to greater exposure to the regulars in training and on operations, these reservists 
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are gradually professionalising by emulating them. This is most obvious in thier conceptions 
of service as a job, their recognition that operational effectiveness represents the standard by 
which they should be judged, and their acceptance that the regulars have the right to judge 
them. Their growing sensitivity to reputational damage, and their desire for professional status, 
provide further indicators of the slow percolation of professional culture into the British 
reserves as integration with the regulars continues. Meanwhile, it is also possible to theorise 
more broadly that British reserve discipline may differ subtly from the regulars in that while 
the core group remains important for self-discipline, the locus of discipline is primarily social 
rather than professional. Given the voluntary nature of reserve service, this is likely to take 
some time to change. The same is true of these reservists’ primarily social source of cohesion. 
Nevertheless, FR20 is gradually encouraging a more professional culture in these reserve units. 
Indeed, given the serious issues concerning their ability to recruit to deliver the required 
capability, this may become FR20’s most enduring success.   
This paper has also made a number of significant contributions to the wider cohesion 
literature. For the first time, it used all three cohesion methodologies to triangulate evidence. 
In doing so, it has sought to bridge the methodological gap between the classical and revisionist 
approaches to demonstrate that these can be complementary. Most importantly, this paper also 
originally contributes to the cohesion debate by focusing on reserve forces. In examining 
reserve logistics cohesion, it has brought nuance to the debate by addressing scholar’s focus on 
regular infantry forces. Furthermore, it has argued that the locus for cohesion amongst reserves 
logisticians remains predominantly social, and subtly different to that identified by the 
revisionist cohesion scholars in regular infantry forces. Although FR20 is changing this in some 
areas, given the reserves part-time nature, it is likely to remain so for some time to come. 
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Finally, this study has shown that reserve and logistic forces provide a rich seam for cohesion 
scholars to explore further. 
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